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From Bali to Copenhagen: Towards a Shared 









In December 2009, the eyes of the world were on the Danish 
capital Copenhagen. ―Copenhagen‖ was to set the world on course to 
forestall dangerous climate change. To that end, Copenhagen was to 
yield at least the contours of a global regime that would commit all 
major economies to a long-term curbing of their greenhouse gas 
emissions. But Copenhagen did not go as planned. In the end, it 
produced a slim document dubbed the Copenhagen Accord, 
negotiated at the eleventh hour by only five countries (Brazil, China, 
India, South Africa, and the United States) and later ―taken note of‖ 
by the 194 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) just before their meeting was gavelled to 
a close.1 U.S. President Barack Obama, who had brokered the 
Copenhagen Accord, called it a ―meaningful and unprecedented 
 
† Metcalf Chair in Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 
This Article draws on JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, Climate Change: 
Building a Global Legal Regime, in LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (forthcoming Aug. 2010) (manuscript at ch. 4, 
on file with author). 
1. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Fifteenth Sess., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen, Den., Draft 
Decision -/CP 15: Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY OF COP 15 AND CMP 5 (2009), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/copenhagen-cop15-summary.pdf.  
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breakthrough . . . .‖2 But for many others the outcome spells failure, 
both in the world‘s fight against climate change and in the UN 
climate change regime.3 
Climate change may well be the single most important public 
policy challenge of our time.4 It is planetary in scope and inter-
generational in its implications. Even more importantly, because 
climate change implicates virtually all production and consumption 
processes, addressing it is about nothing less than changing the way 
we do everything that we do everywhere in the world. Climate 
change, then, is also a classic collective action problem. It can be 
solved only if all states, or at least the major greenhouse gas emitters, 
cooperate.  
In addition, climate change raises a series of difficult questions of 
equity and, some say, global environmental justice.5 Historically, 
emissions of greenhouse gases have been far greater in the 
industrialized world. The emissions of industrialized countries still 
significantly exceed those of developing countries,6 although the 
emissions of some large developing countries are projected to rise 
sharply over the next two decades.7 In 2006, China surpassed the 
United States as the largest national emitter of greenhouse gases.8 
 
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President During Press Availability 
in Copenhagen (Dec. 18, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-press-
availability-copenhagen). 
3. See, e.g., James Kanter, E.U. Blames Others for „Great Failure‟ on Climate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/w 
orld/europe/23iht-climate.html; Donna Bryson, South Africa Blasts Copenhagen 
Failure, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 22, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wir 
eStory?id=9399596. 
4. See, e.g., David A. King, Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate or 
Ignore?, 303 SCI. 176, 176 (2004). 
5. For an extensive, interdisciplinary literature review, see Stephen M. Gardiner, 
Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555 (2004). 
6. This is true for total, per capita, and especially historic global emissions. See, 
e.g., KEVIN BAUMERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS 4, 11, 13 (2004), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/. 
7. Id. at 15–16. 
8. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, EACH COUNTRY‘S SHARE OF CO2 
EMISSIONS (2006),  
http://www.ucsusa.org/globalwarming/scienceandimpacts/science/each-countrys-
share-of-co2.html; John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes US as World‟s 
Biggest CO2 Emitter, GUARDIAN, June 19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/env 
ironment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews.  
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However, Chinese per capita emissions remain far lower than those 
of the United States or the European Union.9 
The effects of climate change are likely to disproportionately 
impact developing countries, many of which are especially 
vulnerable to such effects.10 Industrialized countries have vastly 
larger economic and technological capacity not only to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions but also to adapt to its consequences.11 
The gulf between radically different perceptions of the problem is 
not easily bridged. Many developing countries see climate politics as 
part of a larger pattern of historical and economic injustices and so 
demand that industrialized countries bear the primary burden of 
combating climate change. In turn, many industrialized countries 
insist on developing country participation as a matter of pragmatic 
problem solving or even ―fairness.‖12 
The UNFCCC was adopted in 199213 and supplemented by the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997.14 However, the Kyoto Protocol imposes 
emission reduction commitments on only some of the major emitters 
and does so only for the period from 2008 to 2012. Negotiations for a 
more comprehensive set of mid- and long-term commitments were 
meant to lead to an agreement by the end of 2009, but the outcome of 
the December meeting leaves uncertain whether and when the 
Copenhagen Accord will be turned into a formal legal instrument. 
Much attention has been paid to the back-and-forth between China 
(and India) and the United States. I want to suggest that the climate 
 
9. Steve Howard & Changhua Wu, Foreword to THE CLIMATE GROUP, CHINA‘S 
CLEAN REVOLUTION (2008),  
http://www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/Chinas_Clean_Revolution.pdf (noting 
that, ―[i]n 2007, China reached a per capita level of 5.1 metric tons compared to the 
European Union‘s 8.6 metric tons and the USA‘s 19.4 metric tons‖) (citation 
omitted). 
10. BAUMERT & PERSHING, supra note 6, at 17–18. 
11. See id. at 17–20. 
12. See J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF INJUSTICE: 
GLOBAL INEQUALITY, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS, AND CLIMATE POLICY 136 (2007). 
13. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].  
14. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
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negotiations are not just about who cuts or pays how much and who 
drives the hardest bargain. They are also about ―principle.‖ In other 
words, agreement on the principles that frame the climate regime is 
key to its evolution. My argument is that it is crucial to arrive at both 
a genuinely shared understanding of the regime‘s framing principle, 
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), and a post-2012 
agreement that is consonant with that understanding. It is equally 
crucial to agree on the stated objective of the climate regime, namely 
to avert dangerous climate change. 
Both the regime‘s objective and CBDR are enshrined in the 
Climate Convention, but the treaty text left the underlying scientific 
and normative controversies unresolved. The efforts to develop a 
―shared vision for long-term cooperative action,‖15 launched at a 
meeting of the parties in Bali in 2007, ran into various stumbling 
blocks in Copenhagen. Nevertheless, these continued efforts provide 
an opportunity to explore how the objective and CBDR have shaped 
parties‘ positions and, in turn, how regime participants have sought to 
clarify and shift the meaning of these norms. 
In this brief Article, I first offer an overview of the CBDR 
principle as it has evolved in the regime and develop my argument 
that CBDR, in turn, has been the climate regime‘s anchor principle, 
shaping its evolution and accounting at least in part for its resilience. 
I then evaluate the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations in light 
of the regime objective and the CBDR principle.  
II. CBDR AND THE CLIMATE REGIME 
Before turning to an assessment of the role of CBDR, it is 
important to consider another element of the treaty, which might at 
first glance seem to play merely a perfunctory role—namely the 
provision outlining its objective. As will become apparent, the 
objective and CBDR together provide the parameters for action under 
the climate regime. Global measures to combat climate change must 
not only be capable of meeting the regime‘s objective; they must also 
do so in accordance with the CBDR principle. Similarly, it would not 
be enough for climate action under the regime to be in keeping with 
 
15. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Thirteenth Sess., Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision 
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter Bali Action Plan], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/ 
cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3. 
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parties‘ common but differentiated responsibilities, as the parties‘ 
actions must also measure up to the treaty objective. In the following 
discussion, I focus less on the formal legal requirements that may 
flow from the objective and the CBDR principle than on the 
influence that they in fact exert on the evolution of the climate 
regime. 
A. The Role of the Objective 
The ―ultimate objective of [the Climate] Convention and any 
related legal instruments . . . is to achieve . . . [the] stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.‖16 
Among the parties to the Climate Convention, this objective has 
achieved a taken-for-granted quality. It underpins the Kyoto Protocol 
and has framed the negotiations for post-2012 commitments.17 But 
only relatively recently has a stronger shared understanding emerged 
around the meaning of the regime‘s objective.18 The release in 2007 
of the Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) injected a new sense of urgency into the 
discussions19 and provided unequivocal evidence of human induced 
 
16. UNFCCC, supra note 13, art. 2. 
17. States, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental observers 
routinely invoke the objective in submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). For access to submissions made 
since the AWG-LCA‘s first session in March 2008, see United Nations, Documents 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention, http://unfccc.int/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/items/4918.php 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2010). E.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention, Fourth Sess., Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1–10, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16/Rev.1 
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/16 
r01.pdf. 
18. See Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for 
Limiting Global Warming to 2° C, 458 NATURE 1158, 1158 (2009) (noting that 
―[m]ore than 100 countries have adopted a global warming limit of 2˚ C or below 
(relative to pre-industrial levels) as a guiding principle for mitigation efforts to 
reduce climate change risks, impacts and damages‖) (citation omitted). 
19. See Richard B. Alley et al., IPCC 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
BRUNNEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:44 PM 
2010] FROM BALI TO COPENHAGEN 91 
climate change.20 Perhaps most importantly, the IPCC drove home 
the point that global greenhouse gas emissions would have to peak 
around 2020 and would have to be dramatically reduced by 2050 if 
there was to be a reasonable chance of averting dangerous warming.21 
However, it was not until 2009 that the major emitting states were 
finally willing to quantify that objective, agreeing that global 
temperature increases should not exceed two degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels. This agreement was reflected first in 
declarations of the 2009 G8 Summit and the Major Economies Forum 
(MEF) on Energy and Climate convened by U.S. President Obama to 
engage the seventeen states that account for roughly eighty percent of 
global carbon emissions.22 The two-degree Celsius benchmark was 
also confirmed in the Copenhagen Accord.23 African and small island 
states had been pushing especially hard for recognition of a more 
ambitious temperature limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius,24 but in this 
respect the Copenhagen Accord calls only for an assessment of its 
implementation by 2015 in light of, among other things, the 
Convention‘s ultimate objective.25 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 
2007). A growing chorus of voices warns that even the IPCC‘s worst-case 
scenarios are in fact too conservative and that global climate change is occurring at 
a much faster rate than expected, in part due to various feedback effects. See PEW 
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, KEY SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE 
IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: SCIENCE BRIEF 2 (2009), http://www.pewcli 
mate.org/brief/science-developments/June2009. 
20. See Alley et al., supra note 19, at 2–3 (considering it to be ―very likely,‖ i.e., 
more than ninety percent certain, that anthropogenic factors account for these 
increases). 
21. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
MITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 25, 39, 90 (B. 
Metz et al. eds., 2007). 
22. See G8 Leaders Declaration, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable 
Future, para. 65 (July 9, 2009),  
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.p
df; Press Release, The White House, Declaration of the Leaders: The Major 
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (July 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Declaration-of-the-Leaders-the-
Major-Economies-Forum-on-Energy-and-Climate/. 
23. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, para. 1. 
24. David Doniger, The Copenhagen Accord: A Big Step Forward, CLIMATE 
PROGRESS, Dec. 28, 2009, http://climateprogress.org/2009/12/28/the-copenhagen-
accord-a-big-step-forward/. 
25. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, para. 12. 
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This might all seem like small progress, but the ramifications are 
potentially significant. The temperature target of two degrees Celsius 
permits extrapolations regarding maximum allowable concentrations 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which in turn permit 
conclusions about the timing and extent of the emission reductions 
required to achieve those concentrations.26 IPCC findings, confirmed 
by later analyses, suggest that robust action is urgently required.27 To 
have a reasonable chance of meeting the objective, greenhouse gas 
emissions must peak within the next six years, followed by 
significant medium- and long-term emission reductions.28 By 2020, 
developed country emissions would have to be cut by twenty-five to 
forty percent; by 2050, they would have to be reduced by eighty to 
ninety-five percent.29 In other words, its central concept now having 
been defined, the Article 2 objective not only provides general 
direction to states‘ efforts but sets a bar against which the credibility 
of emission reduction commitments can be measured.  
B. The Role of CBDR 
The Climate Convention calls upon parties to protect the climate 
system ―on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.‖30 The 
repeated references to CBDR in the climate regime, including most 
recently in the Copenhagen Accord, confirm that CBDR is the most 
 
26. The negotiating position of the European Union is constructed precisely in 
this fashion. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius—
the Way Ahead for 2020 and Beyond, at 2, 9, COM (2007) 2 final (Oct. 1, 2007) 
[hereinafter EU Commission Communication on Limiting Global Change to 2 
Degrees Celsius], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=COM:2007:0002:FIN:EN:PDF.  
27. See Meinshausen et al., supra note 18, at 1160. 
28. See KATHERINE RICHARDSON ET AL., UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, CLIMATE 
CHANGE: GLOBAL RISKS, CHALLENGES & DECISIONS COPENHAGEN 2009, 10–12 
MARCH, at 18–20 (2009), available at http://climatecongress.ku.dk/pdf/synthesi 
sreport/; Barker et al., supra, note 21, at 90. 
29. This is the range of required reductions that was established in the IPCC‘s 
2007 Report. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 66–67 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
30. UNFCCC, supra note 13, art. 3(1). 
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important among the principles that frame the climate regime.31 
However, it is one thing to enshrine a principle in a treaty and quite 
another for that principle to have an agreed-upon meaning. A closer 
look at the UNFCCC, related sources, and relevant practice reveals 
that, while some elements of CBDR are generally agreed upon, others 
are still subject to debate.  
Based on the submissions by states under the auspices of the Bali 
Action Plan, it seems fair to say that there is broad consensus that 
states have a common responsibility to address climate change,32 that 
their resulting individual responsibilities should be differentiated,33 
and that industrialized countries should take the lead in combating 
climate change.34 Much less common ground exists with respect to 
the criteria for differentiation of individual state responsibilities. For 
instance, disagreements remain on whether historical and per capita 
emissions are appropriate criteria for differentiation35 and whether 
CBDR requires industrialized states to provide financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries.36 
Meanwhile, it is generally accepted that capacity differentials, 
especially between developing and industrialized states, are 
relevant.37 More recently, there has also been growing support for 
 
31. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, para. 1. 
32. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, First 
Sess., Bangkok, Thail., Mar. 1–Apr. 8, 2008, Views Regarding the Work 
Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 
Under the Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1 (Mar. 3, 2008) 
[hereinafter UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Views (1st Sess.)], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca1/eng/misc01.pdf. See, e.g., id. at 66 
(stating Singapore‘s view that ―[a]ll countries, both developed and developing, 
have a part to play to address climate change . . .‖). 
33. See Lavanya Rajamani, From Stockholm to Johannesburg: The Anatomy of 
Dissonance in the International Environmental Dialogue, 12 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 23, 31 (2003). 
34. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Fifth 
Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., Mar. 29–Apr. 8, 2009, Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and 
Components of the Agreed Outcome: Note by the Chair, para. 30, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/4 (Part II) (Mar. 18, 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca5/eng/04p02.pdf. 
35. See Jutta Brunnée, Climate Change, Global Environmental Justice and 
International Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN 
CONTEXT 316, 326–27 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009). 
36. See Rajamani, supra note 33, at 31. 
37. See, e.g., Tuula Honkonen, The Principle of Common But Differentiated 
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differentiation among industrialized and developing countries.38 The 
latter trend is of particular interest and is well illustrated by the 
shared vision negotiations. They reveal that states‘ understandings of 
the CBDR principle are evolving in this respect. To be sure, some 
states remained staunchly opposed to differentiation among 
developing countries. For example, according to China, ―[t]he 
principle of ‗common but differentiated responsibilities‘ between 
developed and developing countries is the keystone of the 
Convention . . . . Any further sub-categorization of developing 
countries runs against the Convention . . . .‖39 But the view that the 
CBDR principle, as reflected in the climate regime, does not preclude 
and may even require differentiation within groups appeared to be 
shared by a growing number of parties, both developed and 
developing.40 For example, Australia argued: 
There has to be yet further differentiation of responsibilities 
and capabilities other than highlighting the vulnerability and 
lack of capacity of some Parties to respond to the impacts of 
climate change.  
  There is considerable variation in the circumstances of the 
 
Responsibility in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations, 18 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & 
INT‘L ENVTL. L. 257, 259 (2009) (commenting on the fact that both the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol are explicitly based on the distinction between Annex I 
(industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition) and non-
Annex I (developing) countries). 
38. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, 
Fourth Sess., Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1–10, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties—
Addendum, at 14, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 
2008) (stating France‘s view, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/aw 
glca4/eng/misc05a01.pdf (on behalf of the European Community) of enhanced 
national and international action on the mitigation of climate change). 
39. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Fourth 
Sess., Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1–10, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties, at 34, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (Oct. 27, 2008), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/misc05.pdf (stating China‘s 
views on implementation of the Climate Convention through long-term cooperative 
action). 
40. But see Lavanya Rajamani, Differentiation in the Post-2012 Climate 
Regime, 4 POL‘Y Q. 48, 49 (2008) (noting that most developing countries oppose 
efforts to differentiate between them). 
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191 countries in the UNFCCC. Accordingly, there can be 
many different approaches to differentiating and grouping 
countries according to such circumstances.41 
Similarly, France submitted on behalf of the European Community 
that ―a key issue to explore . . . is what the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities means for 
national appropriate mitigation action between and within 
groupings . . . .‖42 Developing countries, in turn, focused their 
remarks primarily on differentiation within their group. For example, 
the task of the negotiations for Bangladesh was to ―[d]etermine 
global mitigation targets for post Kyoto climate regime based on 
common but differentiated responsibility (regarding but not limited to 
the time paths, peaking years and allowable limits of emission) 
between the developed and developing countries and within 
developing countries, between the LDCs and the rest of them.‖43 
Egypt maintained that ―responsibilities should be seen against the 
fact that there are different levels of development within developing 
countries. We therefore call for the inclusion of criterion of income 
level and growth in the issue of climate change . . . .‖44 Finally, the 
Maldives observed that, ―while the differing national circumstances 
between developed and developing countries have been 
acknowledged in Article 1(b)(v) [of the Bali Action Plan], vast 
differences also exist between many of the developing countries, 
 
41. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, First 
Sess., Bangkok, Thail., Mar. 31–Apr. 4, 2008, Views Regarding the Work 
Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 
Under the Convention: Submissions from Parties—Addendum, at 7–8, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1/Add.2 (Mar. 20, 2008), available at  
http://unfcccbali.org/unfccc/images/document/Action_Under_Convention.pdf 
(stating Australia‘s view on a long-term global goal for emission reductions). 
 
42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Third 
Sess., Accra, Ghana, Aug. 21–27, 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties, at 5, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2 (Aug. 14, 2008), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca3/eng/misc02.pdf (stating France‘s 
view (on behalf of the European Community) on mitigation, including by 
technology and finance). 
43. UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Views (1st Sess.), supra note 32, at 10 
(Bangladesh‘s submission on the Bali Action Plan). LDCs refer to least developed 
countries. 
44. Id. at 23 (Egypt‘s submission on long-term cooperative action).  
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particularly the large ones and the LDC[s].‖45 
Notwithstanding lingering debates about its meaning, CBDR has 
been a crucial factor in stabilizing and directing the climate regime to 
date. The power of the principle is illustrated, for example, by the 
inability of the Bush Administration to extricate itself from the UN 
regime. Arguably, the United States‘ attitude towards the Kyoto 
Protocol antagonized others at least in part because it appeared to 
challenge head on the basic ideas that animate CBDR. As we have 
seen, the notion that addressing climate change is a common 
responsibility is a strongly shared understanding.46 Against this 
normative backdrop, the United States‘ refusal to join the Kyoto 
Protocol was widely read as unilateralism and thus struck a 
particularly negative chord with other nations.47 Similarly, it may 
well be sensible to suggest that all major emitters, including 
developing countries, must participate for a climate regime to be 
effective. But the flat refusal by one of the wealthiest states in the 
world—and one of its major carbon emitters—to take on emission 
reduction commitments clashed with a generally shared sense that 
developed countries should take the lead in combating climate 
change.48 
Interestingly, under the new Administration, a re-articulation of the 
U.S. position is discernible. While the United States still insists on 
developing country participation in an emissions regime, its 
proposals are now expressed in terms that are compatible with 
CBDR. Thus, the argument is no longer a bald statement that the 
United States will not take on commitments unless major developing 
countries do the same. Instead, the argument is that CBDR actually 
 
45. Id. at 32 (Maldives‘ submission on Bali Action Plan). 
46. See Honkonen, supra note 37, at 265. 
47. See Anger at US Climate Retreat, BBC, Mar. 28, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1248278.stm. 
48. Indeed, rarely have states so openly expressed their resentment of U.S. 
climate policy as did Papua New Guinea‘s ambassador for climate change when, 
reacting to the outgoing Bush Administration‘s initial refusal to support the Bali 
Action Plan on long-term cooperative action, the ambassador stated that, ―if for 
some reason you‘re not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us. Please get out of 
the way.‖ Andrew C. Revkin, Issuing a Bold Challenge to the U.S. Over Climate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at F2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/ 
22/science/earth/22conv.html (quoting Kevin Conrad). 
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demands, or at least accommodates, differentiation among 
developing countries,49 suggesting that major developing economies 
with large emissions must accept some emissions commitments. In 
other words, the United States has stopped arguing against the basic 
understandings that underpin the regime and has begun to work with 
the CBDR concept. 
Major developing countries like China and India have always 
sought to draw rhetorical power from the convention principles. They 
worked hard during the negotiations of the UNFCCC to enshrine 
principles such as equity and CBDR in the convention and have 
consistently raised these concepts in the negotiations for a post-2012 
regime.50 As noted, in the past, China and India refused to 
contemplate any emission reduction commitments whatsoever. The 
argument was that pursuant to CBDR only industrialized countries 
should take on such commitments and, at any rate, they should take 
the lead in cutting emissions. While the latter point resonates with the 
shared understandings of CBDR, the former fell increasingly out of 
step with the basic thrust of the principle. Once China and India 
emerged as major carbon emitters—with China displacing the United 
States as the single largest emitter—the CBDR principle began to 
work against insistence on complete exemption from emission 
reductions.51 Instead, the notion of common responsibility actually 
calls for some action by all major emitters. The most widely shared 
rationale for CBDR, capacity differentials, suggests that salient 
 
49. See, e.g., UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Ideas and Proposals, Fourth 
Sess., supra note 17, para. 22(h) (citing Australia, New Zealand, the Russian 
Federation, and the United States for the proposition that ―[n]ew sight on the 
differentiation among Parties is required . . . based on recent advances in scientific 
knowledge and changing social and economic situation in the world . . .‖).  
50. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT‘L L. 451, 501–05 (1993); e.g., 
UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group Views (1st Sess.), supra note 32, at 18 (stating 
China‘s view that ―[i]n developing . . . [a shared] vision [for long-term cooperative 
action], it is important to take into account the principles of equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities . . . ‖); id. at 31–32 (India‘s submission on long-term 
cooperative action). 
51. This point has not escaped the attention of the new U.S. Administration. See 
Glenn Kessler, Clinton, Indian Minister Clash Over Emissions Reduction Pact, 
WASH. POST, July 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/07/19/AR2009071900705.html (noting that Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton ―‗completely‘ understood Indian arguments about per capita 
emissions . . . but [nevertheless thought] that the per capita argument ‗loses force‘ 
as developing countries rapidly become the biggest emitters‖). 
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differences within the developing and developed country groupings 
of states should be taken into account. Indeed, even if ―historical‖ 
contributions to climate change were generally seen to be a criterion 
for differentiation, CBDR does not completely insulate major 
developing country emitters from emissions-related commitments.52 
Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol use 1990 as a reference 
year for emission reductions.53 The emissions trajectory in major 
developed and developing emitters since 1990 militate in favour of 
the latter‘s inclusion in a commitment regime, while reducing the 
exposure of developed countries with respect to their cumulative 
emissions.54 As a result, it has become increasingly difficult for major 
developing economies with significant carbon emissions to refuse 
reduction commitments outright. This accounts at least in part for the 
redoubled efforts of China and India to ensure the continuation of the 
Kyoto Protocol while softening their stance on emission reductions.55 
III. THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD 
A. CBDR 
Arguably, to respect the CBDR principle, a post-2012 regime must 
see developed countries take the lead on emission reductions through 
credible mid-term targets as well as take on commitments that reflect 
their greater capacity and share of emissions. Major developing 
countries, by contrast, may initially commit to mitigation-related 
actions but not take on specific reduction targets. However, given 
developing countries‘ rapidly rising share of global emissions, CBDR 
is compatible with, and even demands, credible reductions by the 
 
52. See Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments Under the Climate Regime, 9 REV. 
EUR. COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 120, 130 (2000). 
53. See UNFCCC, supra note 13, art. 4(2); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 
3(1). 
54. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in 
Copenhagen, at 5, COM (2009) 39 final (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0039:FIN:EN:PDF 
(submitting that ―[t]he accepted Kyoto base year, 1990, should be used as the 
historical reference point . . . [for further emission reductions by developed 
countries] after 2012‖). 
55. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text. 
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main developing country emitters, at least in the longer term. Finally, 
differentiation according to capacity and emissions share suggests 
that poorer countries or countries with negligible emissions should be 
subject to considerably less onerous requirements. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in Copenhagen, the discernible 
trends in the climate discussions are broadly consonant with these 
parameters. The 2007 Bali Action Plan made only general reference 
to the urgency of the situation and the need for ―deep cuts in global 
emissions . . . .‖56 At the time, only the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol 
acknowledged that developed countries had to achieve a collective 
emissions cut of twenty-five to forty percent below 1990 levels by 
2020.57 Among the developed country parties, only the European 
Union was on record with a unilateral commitment to achieve a 
twenty percent reduction by 2020, offering a thirty percent cut if 
other states followed suit.58 In the lead up to the Copenhagen 
meeting, other industrialized countries (and some industrializing 
states) announced reduction commitments that they were prepared to 
make.59 The most significant movement undoubtedly came from the 
United States, which had, since abandoning the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001, refused to take on international emission reduction 
commitments. In November 2009, President Barack Obama 
announced his Administration‘s willingness to cut U.S. emissions by 
seventeen percent below 2005 levels by 2020.60 This shift prompted 
China to come forward with a pledge to reduce the carbon intensity 
 
56. Bali Action Plan, supra note 15, pmbl. 
57. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol on its 
Resumed Fourth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2001, para. 16, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resou 
rce/docs/2007/awg4/eng/05.pdf. 
58. See EU Commission Communication on Limiting Global Change to 2 
Degrees Celsius, supra note 26, at 2; Climate control: The European Union Thinks 
It Can Be a Model for the World on Climate Change. Can it?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 
15, 2007, at 59, available at EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, AN 24406423. 
59. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Neil MacFarquhar, Industrialized Nations Unveil 
Plans to Rein in Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/science/earth/20climate.html. 
60. John M. Broder, Obama to Go to Copenhagen with Emissions Target, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A1, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26climate.html. 
BRUNNEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:44 PM 
100 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:86 
 
 
of its economy by forty to forty-five percent from 2005 levels by 
2020.61 India followed suit with an intensity-based proposal of its 
own.62 
The submissions by parties pursuant to the Bali Action Plan 
foreshadowed some of the dynamics that played out during the 
Copenhagen meetings. Since Copenhagen was to yield commitments 
on concrete emission reductions or, for developing countries, other 
―actions‖ on climate change,63 it is perhaps not surprising that matters 
came to a head. It became apparent that many developing countries 
saw a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol as essential to the further 
development of the climate regime. For some developing states, 
notably small island states, this position reflected their desire to 
maintain the only instrument that contained legally binding emission 
reduction commitments by industrialized countries.64 For others, led 
by China and India, Kyoto enshrined the only acceptable model of 
differentiation—the distinction between industrialized states that had 
binding emission reduction commitments and developing countries 
that did not.65 By contrast, most industrialized countries wished to see 
 
61. Edward Wong & Keith Bradsher, China Joins U.S. in Pledge of Hard 
Targets on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/science/earth/27climate.html. 
62. See Rama Lakshmi, Moves by U.S., China Induce India to Do Its Bit on 
Climate, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/01/AR2009120102591.html.  
63. For industrialized states, the Bali Action Plan contemplates ―[n]ationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives, . . .‖ whereas for developing countries it 
envisages only ―[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions . . . .‖ See Bali Action 
Plan, supra note 15, para. 1(b)(i)–(ii). 
64. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, 
Eighth Sess., Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–15, 2009, Ideas and Proposals on the 
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from 
Parties, at 15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.8 (Dec. 18, 2009), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/misc08.pdf (proposal 
by Alliance of Small Island States for the survival of the Kyoto Protocol); 
LAVANYA RAJAMANI, CTR. FOR POL‘Y RESEARCH, THE COPENHAGEN AGREED 
OUTCOME: FORM, SHAPE & INFLUENCE 1–2 (2009), available at 
http://www.cprindia.org/policyupload/1259569856-CPR%20Polic%20Brief2.pdf. 
65. See, e.g., “Kyoto Principles” Crucial in Climate Talks: China, REUTERS, 
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AD0NV20091114; Big 
Developing Countries Form Climate Change Front, REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPEK20047.  
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the Kyoto Protocol replaced by a single, comprehensive instrument 
with appropriately differentiated commitments for all countries, 
including emission-related commitments for the major developing 
economies.66 
In other words, the fate of the Kyoto Protocol became one of the 
battle grounds for the underlying questions of principle. After all, the 
stark distinction drawn in the UNFCCC between Annex I parties 
(industrialized states and countries with economies in transition) and 
non-Annex I parties (developing countries) to the Climate 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol—which applied this distinction 
to emission reduction commitments—was seen by some developing 
countries as a bulwark against efforts to single out some developing 
countries on account of their growing greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Bali Action Plan had begun to weaken the bulwark, replacing the 
distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I states with a more 
open-ended distinction between developed and developing 
countries.67 Still, for many developing countries, the Bali Action Plan 
maintained at least a ―firewall‖ against further differentiation and, 
hence, against emission reduction commitments for developing 
countries.68 
At the time of this writing, the ultimate fate of the Kyoto Protocol 
is uncertain. A Danish proposal that would have set the post-2012 
climate regime on a single instrument track was leaked to the press 
shortly after the beginning of the Copenhagen talks.69 Developing 
countries, led by a small but determined group of states—which were 
widely seen to operate with at least the backing of China and India—
resisted the formal introduction of the text into the negotiating 
 
66. See LAVANYA RAJAMANI, CTR. FOR POL‘Y RESEARCH, THE ―CLOUD‖ OVER 
THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS: FROM BANGKOK TO COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND 1–3 
(2009), available at http://www.cprindia.org/policyupload/1256103508-
CPR%20Polic%20Brief.pdf. 
67. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 15, para. 1(b)(i)–(ii); Chris Spence et al., 
Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate Change Negotiation 
Process, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. L. 142, 150 (2008) 
(commenting on the subtle but significant shift in the language of the Bali Action 
Plan). 
68. See RAJAMANI, supra note 66, at 2. 
69. See John Vidal, Copenhagen Climate Summit in Disarray After „Danish 
Text‟ Leak, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2009,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-
disarray-danish-text (including link to the leaked ―Danish text‖).  
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process.70 The fact that the proposal had apparently been developed in 
consultation with only the United States and the United Kingdom did 
not help matters, nor did the fact that many developing countries saw 
its content as skewed towards industrialized country preferences.71 
Whereas the Danish proposal appeared designed to lead to a 
replacement of the Kyoto Protocol, the last-minute Copenhagen 
Accord leaves the issue unmentioned.72 
Nonetheless, the Copenhagen Accord suggests some softening in 
China and India‘s resistance to emission-related measures. Indeed, 
the document does contain some genuine breakthroughs. In addition 
to ―quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020‖ by Annex I 
parties, it envisages ―mitigation actions‖ by non-Annex I parties—a 
―first‖ in the climate regime.73 Equally significant, however, is the 
fact that the Copenhagen Accord commits industrialized countries to 
providing ―new and additional resources . . . approaching USD 30 
billion for the period 2010–2012 . . . [and to mobilizing] USD 100 
billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.‖74  
Broadly speaking, the Copenhagen Accord is consonant with the 
CBDR principle. At first glance, the fact that the Copenhagen Accord 
was negotiated by only a small number of states and only 
subsequently acknowledged by all parties to the climate regime may 
appear to undercut the notion of ―common responsibility.‖ Indeed, a 
―coalition of the willing‖ approach would seem to run counter to that 
notion. Many developing countries insisted on maintaining the 
consensus approach to decision making that had become the default 
practice in the climate regime and complained bitterly about the lack 
of access to and transparency of the negotiations that produced the 
 
70. See Dan Bodansky, The Illegitimacy of “Legitimacy”, OPINIO JURIS, Dec. 
17, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/12/17/the-illegitimacy-of-%e2%80%9cle 
gitimacy. 
71. See Vidal, supra note 69. 
72. Apparently, an earlier draft of the document was unacceptable to developing 
countries because of a preambular statement affirming parties‘ ―firm resolve to 
adopt one or more legal instruments,‖ thereby acknowledging the possible demise 
of the Kyoto Protocol. See Jonathan Watts, What Was Agreed at Copenhagen—and 
What Was Left Out, GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/envir 
onment/2009/dec/18/how-copenhagen-text-was-changed. 
73. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, paras. 4–5. 
74. Id. para. 8. 
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Copenhagen Accord.75 However, according to many observers, it was 
in fact a relatively small number of developing countries that blocked 
consensus decision making at a number of crucial junctures, while 
many other developing countries desperately wanted progress to be 
made.76 What is more, while the Copenhagen Accord may have 
ruffled feathers in part because it was announced by the U.S. 
President before it had been released to, let alone sanctioned by, the 
parties to the Climate Convention,77 it did appear to have had the 
support of the leaders of key industrialized and developing states 
from around the world.78 
Even if, procedurally speaking, the Copenhagen Accord was 
squeezed out from between a rock and hard place, its substance is 
more in line with the idea of common responsibility. Developing 
countries did ultimately yield to a key demand of most industrialized 
states by agreeing to commit themselves internationally to the same 
instrument, albeit a nonbinding one.79 Furthermore, notwithstanding 
the negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord by a small group of states, 
its aspiration is to operate in the context of the UNFCCC. It declares 
itself to be guided by the principles of the Climate Convention, 
including CBDR.80 It also envisages drawing on the Climate 
Convention to implement a number of its key provisions. For 
example, the Conference of the Parties is to adopt guidelines for the 
measuring, reporting, and verification of Annex I emission reductions 
and financing, as well as for national communications by non-Annex 
I countries regarding their actions.81 Similarly, in the context of the 
funding commitments by developed countries, the Copenhagen 
Accord envisages a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund to be 
 
75. See JOHN DREXHAGE & DEBORAH MURPHY, INT‘L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., COPENHAGEN: A MEMORABLE TIME FOR ALL THE WRONG REASONS?, INT‘L 
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 2 (2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/cop_memo 
rable_time_wrong_reasons.pdf. 
76. See id.; Doniger, supra note 24; Bodansky, supra note 70; Dan Bodansky, 
Sleepless in Copenhagen, OPINIO JURIS, Dec. 19, 2009, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/12/19/sleepless-in-copenhagen-2/ [hereinafter  
Bodansky, Sleepless in Copenhagen]. 
77. See DREXHAGE & MURPHY, supra note 75. 
78. See Bodansky, Sleepless in Copenhagen, supra note 76; Doniger, supra note 
24 (citing support by leaders of twenty-eight developed and developing countries). 
79. See Doniger, supra note 24 (observing that such a development would have 
been unthinkable only a year earlier and that China and India would not have 
agreed to the accord had it been legally binding). 
80. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 1. 
81. Id. paras. 4–5. 
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―established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the 
[Climate] Convention . . . .‖82 
The ultimate relationship between the Copenhagen Accord and the 
climate regime is difficult to predict, and the Accord does not provide 
guidance on the matter. The Accord merely endorses two parallel 
decisions under the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, 
respectively, to extend by one year the formal negotiations towards 
an agreed-upon outcome on post-2012 climate action.83 Many parties 
are still looking to bring the Accord more resolutely into the climate 
regime than was accomplished when parties decided only to take note 
of it.84 Indeed, earlier drafts of the Accord had envisaged that it would 
be converted into a legally binding instrument within a year‘s time. 
However, the relevant text was dropped (apparently) in the face of 
resistance by some states, including China, India, and Saudi Arabia.85  
As for the idea of differentiated responsibilities, the Accord clearly 
distinguishes between industrialized and developing countries. As we 
have seen, it reverts to the rigid categorization of states as Annex I 
and non-Annex I and distinguishes the commitments of these two 
groups of parties. Furthermore, Annex I parties opt into the 
Copenhagen Accord by registering their target pledges in one 
appendix to the Accord, while developing countries register their 
emissions intensity pledges in another.86 Finally, the Accord requires 
 
82. Id. paras. 8, 10. 
83. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Draft 
Decision -/CP.15: Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action Under the Convention, para. 1, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_lca_auv.pdf; United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Draft 
Decision -/CMP.5: Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, para. 2, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cmp5_awg_auv.pdf.  
84. See, e.g., UK‟s Brown Says Climate Change Agreement Possible, TIMES OF 
INDIA, Jan. 4, 2010,  
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/developmental-issues/UKs-
Brown-says-climate-change-agreement-possible/articleshow/5409324.cms.  
85. See Bryson, supra note 3; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
SUMMARY OF COP 15 AND CMP 5 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ 
copenhagen-cop15-summary.pdf. 
86. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, paras. 4–5. 
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developed countries to provide significant resources to developing 
countries. While the Accord therefore reflects the insistence of key 
developing countries on the distinction between industrialized and 
developing countries, it also suggests that the idea of differentiation 
among developing countries is taking hold. Within the group of non-
Annex I parties, the Accord singles out least developed countries and 
developing nations that are especially vulnerable to climate change. 
Notably, whereas non-Annex I states ―will implement mitigation 
actions, . . . least developed and small island developing States may 
undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.‖87 The 
Accord also identifies the most vulnerable developing countries, 
―especially least developed countries, small island developing States 
and Africa‖ as priority recipients of adaptation funding.88 
B. The Climate Convention Objective 
The Copenhagen Accord fares less well when measured against the 
objective of the climate regime. To be sure, it declares itself to be in 
pursuit of the objective and endorses the two-degree Celsius 
temperature goal.89 However, collectively, the reduction pledges 
made by Annex I countries in the lead up to the Copenhagen 
meetings have been calculated to promise a reduction only thirteen to 
nineteen percent below 1990 emission levels.90 Although significant, 
these pledges remain considerably below the reduction range said to 
be required to meet the Climate Convention objective. As a result, 
and assuming that parties‘ pledges will track their previous 
announcements, the Copenhagen Accord will not live up to the 
demands of the UNFCCC‘s objective. In fact, when the most 
ambitious emissions pledges for 2020 by developed countries are 
combined with those made by China and India, recent estimates 
suggest that these efforts would put the world on track for, at a 
minimum, a 3.2-degree Celsius temperature increase by 2100.91 
 
87. Id. para. 5. 
88. Id. para. 3. 
89. Id. pmbl., paras. 1–2. 
90. Kelly Levin & Rob Bradley, Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction 
Pledges 2 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_p
ledges_2009-12-04.pdf. 
91. See NIKLAS HÖHNE ET AL., CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, COPENHAGEN 
CLIMATE DEAL—HOW TO CLOSE THE GAP? 6 (2009), http://www.climateactiontr 
acker.org/briefing_paper.pdf. 
BRUNNEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:44 PM 
106 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:86 
 
 
As for a long-term target, the G8 Declaration of 2009 indicates that 
major developed countries were prepared to accept an eighty percent 
emissions cut by 2050, so long as all countries commit to achieving a 
fifty percent reduction in global emissions.92 A similar approach was 
to find expression in the MEF Declaration but was ultimately rejected 
by the developing country members of the forum, led by China and 
India.93 Developing countries were not satisfied with the draft text on 
mid-term targets for developed countries, which merely declared that 
the latter would ―undertake robust aggregate and individual mid-term 
reductions in the 2020 timeframe.‖94 Instead, developing countries 
insisted that industrialized states make commitments in the twenty-
five to forty percent range indicated by the IPCC.95 The issue 
remained unresolved in Copenhagen, given the far more modest 
range of industrialized country commitments. Indeed, an earlier draft 
of the Copenhagen Accord contained a global goal to reduce 
emissions by fifty percent by 2050, with an industrialized country 
pledge of eighty percent.96 The relevant passages were apparently 
dropped because of developing country concerns about an implicit 
commitment to long-term emission cuts on their part.97 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is easy to dismiss the Bali Action Plan‘s notion of a ―shared 
 
92. See G8 Leaders Declaration, supra note 22. 
93. See Alister Doyle, Major Economies Consider Halving World CO2, 
REUTERS, June 25, 2009,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55O4EJ20090625 (reporting a draft text 
according to which the MEF supported ―‗[a]n aspirational goal of reducing global 
emissions by 50 percent by 2050, with developed countries reducing emissions by 
at least 80 percent by 2050‘‖ and declared that developed states would 
―‗[u]ndertake robust aggregate and individual mid-term reductions in the 2020 
timeframe‘‖).  
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95. See Patrick Wintour, Developing Countries Urge G8 to Impose 40% 
Emissions Cut by 2020, GUARDIAN, July 10, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2009/jul/10/developing-countries-emissions-cut-g8. 
96. See David Biello, Draft Text of New “Copenhagen Accord”, SCI. AM., Dec. 
18, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=draft-text-of-new-
copenhagen-accord-2009-12-18. 
97. See Chris Holly, Disappointed Climate Delegates „Take Note‟ of Vague 
Greenhouse Accord, ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.theenergydaily. 
com/events/climateconf2009-12-19.html; DREXHAGE & MURPHY, supra note 75, at 
3. 
BRUNNEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:44 PM 
2010] FROM BALI TO COPENHAGEN 107 
vision‖ for long-term climate action as empty rhetoric. I argue that 
the success of the global climate regime is not guaranteed by a mere 
deal among key participants. To be sure, the difficulties of the 
Copenhagen meeting resulted in good part from the reluctance of 
parties to make ambitious emission-related commitments. But the 
difficulties also stemmed from continuing disagreements about 
important aspects of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities. It stands to reason that a viable post-2012 agreement 
must be consonant with that principle as well as with the regime‘s 
objective. Only then will the foundation exist for specific 
commitments that are legitimate and that can generate a sense of 
commitment among parties. Measured against this yardstick, the 
Copenhagen Accord represents important progress in some respects 
but also falls considerably short in others. 
The Copenhagen Accord does reflect the core elements of the 
CBDR principle. Indeed, in relation to CBDR, the Accord represents 
a flawed but nonetheless important step towards a shared 
understanding of the meaning of the principle, especially as it relates 
to differentiation among developing countries. Given the deficiencies 
in the process that led to the Accord, it is crucial that parties now 
consider the vision of CBDR that it contains. If a shared 
understanding is to emerge, that vision must be genuinely embraced 
by industrialized and developing states rather than simply ―noted.‖ 
By contrast, in relation to the regime objective, there appears to 
exist a shared understanding that temperature increases must be held 
to two degrees Celsius or potentially less.98 Given the emission-
related pledges made by key states prior to the Copenhagen meeting, 
all indications are that the Copenhagen Accord will not live up to the 
requirements of the objective. The fact that over 100 heads of state 
and government attended the Copenhagen Summit attests to the 
importance that governments and people around the world now attach 
to climate change. It is perhaps for this reason that U.S. President 
Obama and others have described the Copenhagen Accord as a ―first 
step‖99 and an ―essential beginning.‖100 
 
98. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
99. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President During Press 
Availability in Copenhagen, supra note 2. 
100. See, e.g., UN Says Copenhagen Deal „a Start‟, BBC, Dec. 19, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8422133.stm. 
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What, then, should we make of the Copenhagen Accord? As I hope 
to have shown, the contours of any future agreement on climate 
change are intertwined with the overall objective and core principle 
of the climate regime. Both have shaped the negotiations and the 
positions that parties have taken. In turn, parties have progressively 
fleshed out the meaning of the regime objective, and their 
interventions under the auspices of the Bali Action Plan reveal 
concerted efforts to maintain or shift the meaning of the CBDR 
principle. The Copenhagen Accord may be best understood not as a 
makeshift solution to climate change but as a barometer for the 
evolving normative understandings in the climate regime. 
 
